Abstract. In an organisational setting, such as an online marketplace, the organisation monitors agent interactions, and enforces norms by means of sanctions. This paper provides an operational semantics for agent interactions within such a setting, distinguishing constitutive norms for monitoring and sanction rules for enforcement of norms. Our contribution emphasizes a more detailed exploration of the processes of monitoring commitments created through agent interactions and imposition of sanctions when commitments are violated. We consider both agent-agent and agent-environment interactions, focusing on operationalizing enforcement of commitment-based norms. We provide a generic way to develop operational semantics from specific definitions of norm behaviour. For an example set of norm behaviours, we sketch some formal properties that follow from our semantics, such as continuity, (non-)interference, and (non-)redundancy.
Introduction
In an open multi-agent environment, agents must coordinate their interactions by means of communication. Following earlier works concerned with multi-agent organisations, we define the semantics of agent interactions, including communication actions, in terms of social commitments [17] . Such commitments constitute institutional facts of an organisation, and it is within an organisational setting such as 2OPL [10] that agents interact. For our purposes, the organisation consists of two main processes: the monitoring process checks for compliance to norms while the enforcement process ensures imposition of sanctions. 5 Agent interactions affect the state of the institutional facts (i.e., commitments). The norms, represented as counts-as rules, define both constitutive as well as regulative norms. Finally, sanction rules are responsible for updating the organisation state as a consequence of detected violations.
Our focus, then, is on what has been called agreement technologies, i.e., how coordination is achieved between autonomous computational entities [2] . Following [10] one can specify norms to govern the interaction between agents. However, we believe that interaction by means of communication should respect a set of generic norms which are inherent in communication actions. We follow the line of works that posit that communication actions create and operate on social commitments [17, 9, 12] . In our setting, an organisation will manage the commitments according to the utterances (messages)
, and actions of the agents, and regiment the compliance of agents with the commitments. Since we represent norms as counts-as rules, we specify the relations between communication actions and commitments explicitly via counts-as rules.
Our contribution emphasizes a more detailed exploration of the processes of monitoring and enforcement through an organisation's tracking of institutional state defined in terms of commitments, which are established and modified through agent communication acts. By adopting a simple set of such actions, and not focusing on the protocol or semantic concerns of a full Agent Communication Language, we are able develop a more technical account for a full operational semantics, and explore its properties.
A common methodology to define an operational semantics in such a paradigm specifies the typical or desired behaviour of the system. For example, explicit acceptance of commitments (i.e., must the creditor accept a commitment, or not?), fulfillment of a commitment's consequent before its antecedent (i.e., can a non-detached be commitment satisfied?), or synchronization details (e.g., if a consquent is fulfilled at the same moment its deadline occurs, is the commitment detached or expired?). Based on such choices, one defines norm behaviour, typically based on a finite state automaton; based on the automaton, one then defines an operational semantics.
Our methodology differs in that, given an automaton defined using rules, we develop a generic way to go from the automaton to the operational semantics. Thus, the semantics for any given description of norm behaviours follow automatically by means of a generic mechanism. Hence our generic methodology can be applied to different sets of counts-as rules, and further can admit constitutive norms that change dynamically.
Normative Organisation
Our model of an exogenous organisation allows individual agents to interact with each other and with their shared environment. The function of an organisation is to monitor and regulate the interaction between agents, i.e., it observes the (inter)actions of agents, evaluates their consequences and imposes sanctions if needed. The agents' (inter)actions are assumed to be observed/received by the organisation as events. The evaluation of agents' (inter)actions as well as their sanctioning are realized based on the norms and sanctions that specify the organisation. In this paper, we focus on commitments as a specific type of norms and study agents' interactions that influence the generation and state of commitments.
For example, consider an organisation such as a marketplace where agents can buy and sell goods from each other. In such an organisation, agent i offers agent j to make a payment p (b,20) (i.e., paying 20 euro for book b) within 5 days if agent j first sends the book s (b,i) within 2 days. We assume that the marketplace has the credit card information of the participating agents and that the agents can give a payment order to the organisation when they have received their goods. We also assume that the marketplace is allowed to withdraw money from a credit card without the order from the card holder only in designated cases, e.g., when the buyer of a good, who has asked the seller to send him the good, returns the good back to the seller, the organisation can then subtract the shipping cost paid by the seller from the credit card of the buyer agent.
The organisation can monitor the agents' interactions, determine the commitments of agents, and ensure that the agents fulfill their commitments-or otherwise take nec-essary measures such as putting the violating agent on a blacklist. The organisation, as an exogenous process, cannot intervene in the decision making of individual agents by either disallowing them to perform actions or forcing them to perform specific actions, i.e., agents are autonomous and decide their own actions.
Agent Interactions
We begin by identifying possible actions that agents can perform to interact with each other or with their shared environment. These include pure communication actions, as well as non-communicative actions that change the actual state of their environment. It is important to notice that it is not our purpose to define an Agent Communication Language (ACL) or a communications protocol [11, 1] . Instead, we select a representative set of actions that influence the generation and state of commitments. The following six actions will prove sufficient for justifying the adequacy of our organisational model for managing and enforcing commitments. We will use variables x, y, etc. to range over the agent names i, j, etc.; propositional variables p, q, etc. to range over propositions a, b, etc.; and finally d, d , etc. to range over deadlines t m , t n , etc. where m, n ∈ N.
-offer(x, y, p, q, d 1 , d 2 ) -x tells y that x will make q true in the environment by deadline d 2 if p becomes true in the environment by deadline d 1 -tell(x, y, p) -x tells y that p is true in the environment -cancel(x, y, q) -x tells y that x will not make q true in the environment -release(y, x, q) -y tells x that x need not make q true in the environment -failure(x, y, p) -x tells y that p cannot be made true in the environment -do(x, p) -x performs an action to make proposition p true in the environment In our running example, agent i can offer agent j to do the payment p (b,20) before time t 5 if agent j sends him the book s (b,i) before time t 2 . Agent i can offer this deal to agent j by performing the following action: offer(i, j, s (b,i) , p (b,20) , t 2 , t 5 ).
Commitments
A commitment is defined as a tuple C = C(x, y, p, q, d 1 , d 2 ). Agent x (as debtor) tells agent y (as creditor) that if proposition p (the antecedent) is brought about by deadline d 1 then x will bring about q (the consequent) by deadline d 2 . In the rest of the paper, we assume that deadline d 1 will be satisfied before deadline d 2 . It is important to note that C is neither a second-order predicate nor a modal operator and that we do not aim at devising a logic to reason about the internal structure of commitments.
is an atomic proposition denoting a specific commitment. Fig. 1 Violated if x cancels a detached commitment. The commitment is Terminated if x cancels it before it is detached, or y releases x from C once it has been detached.
We will write commitment state with superscript, i.e., C state . It will be useful to distinguish violation because of cancel (vc) and violated because of timeout (vt).
Organisation
An organisation is specified by facts, norms (including commitments), and sanctions. We distinguish brute and institutional facts. Brute facts denote the state of the shared environment (e.g., b j denoting the fact that agent j has book b or p (b,20) denoting the fact that 20 euro is paid for book b), while institutional facts denote the normative state of an organisation (e.g.,
, t 2 , t 5 ) denoting the fact that agent i is committed to pay 20 euro before t 5 if agent j sends book b before t 2 ). In the following, we assume Π b and Π i to be finite disjoint sets of brute and institutional facts (constructed by two disjoint sets of brute and institutional atomic propositions), respectively. Moreover, we follow [10] and represent norms by means of counts-as rules that relate brute and institutional facts. The original version of the counts-as construct is of the form "φ counts as ψ in the context c". We represent a counts-as construct as a rule φ ∧ c =⇒ cr ψ, where φ, c ∈ Π b and ψ ∈ Π i . For example, an offer by agent i to agent j to do a payment if j sends i a book counts-as the creation of a Conditional commitment. In the following, we use counts-as rules to evaluate and determine the institutional consequences of a certain environment state. Finally, we represent sanctions by rules of the form φ =⇒ sr ψ, where φ ∈ Π b ∪ Π i and ψ ∈ Π b . Note the difference between counts-as and sanctions rules: the first relates brute to institutional facts, but the latter does vice versa. In our running example, a delay in payment by agent i beyond day 5 will be considered as a violation and will be sanctioned by the organisation by adding agent i to a blacklist. Definition 1. An organisation is specified as (F, cr, sr), where F ⊆ Π b is a set of initial brute facts, cr is a set of counts-as rules, and sr is a set of sanction rules.
In our running example, the organisation is initially specified by some brute facts such as agent j wants to sell a book b, and the blacklist of the organisation is empty, i.e., {b j , BL {} } ⊆ F. The set of facts will change during the execution of multi-agent system, based on the interaction between agents, e.g., the fact p (b,20) will be added to F when an agent pays 20 euro for book b. Note that the institutional facts such as commitments will be generated only during the execution of multi-agent system as a consequence of agents' interactions. Although an organisation can be specified in terms of arbitrary norms [10] , we suppose that specific agents' interaction creates and manipulate social commitments (institutional facts) and claim that manipulation of commitments should respect a specific set of norms. Therefore, we focus on commitment-based norms and represent them as counts-as rules defined in terms of specific actions. Fig. 2 illustrates a set of commitment-based norms, represented as counts-as rules. We next explain these rules, which specify how interactions between agents operate on social commitments. The application of counts-as rules (and the resulting removal and addition of commitments) are explained later in this section when we present the operational semantics of our organisational model in transition rules 1-4, which are introduced in Sect. 2.4, below.
-Performing action "x offers to y that x realizes q before d 2 if y realizes p before d 1 " counts as creation of a conditional commitment (superscript c denotes conditional state of commitment; similar convention is used for other commitment states). The application of this rule #1 by the organisation will add institutional fact C c (x, y, p, q, d 1 , d 2 ) to the institutional facts.
-Performing action "y tells x that p is realized" or "y does act and realizes p" when d 1 is still not passed counts as detaching the conditional commitment. The application of these rules #2 or #3 removes the conditional commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding detached commitment to it.
6
-Performing action "x tells y that q is realized" or "x does act and realizes q" when d 1 is still not passed counts as satisfying the conditional commitment. The application , of these rules #4 or #5 removes the conditional commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding satisfied commitment to it. -Performing action "x tells y that q is realized" or "x does act and realizes q" when d 2 is still not passed counts as satisfying the detached commitment. The application of these rules #6 or #7 removes the detached commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding satisfied commitment to it. -Performing action "x cancels to realizes q" when d 2 is still not passed counts as the violation of the detached commitment. The application of this rule #8 removes the detached commitment and adds a corresponding violated commitment. -Elapsing deadline d 2 counts as the violation of a detached commitment. The application of this rule #9 removes the detached commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding violated commitment to it. -Performing action "y fails to realize p" when d 1 is still not passed counts as expiration of the conditional commitment. The application of this rule #10 removes the conditional commitment and adds a corresponding expired commitment. -Elapsing deadline d 1 counts as expiration of a conditional commitment. The application of this rule #11 removes the conditional commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding expired commitment to it. -Performing action "x cancels to realize q" when d 1 is still not passed counts as termination of the conditional commitment. The application of this rule #12 removes the conditional commitment and adds a corresponding terminated commitment to it. -Performing action "y releases a detached commitment after p has been satisfied" when d 2 is still not passed counts as termination of the conditional commitment. The application of this rule #13 removes the conditional commitment from institutional facts and adds a corresponding terminated commitment to it.
Finally, organisations can be specified in terms of arbitrary sanctions represented by sanction rules [5] . Sanctions are defined in terms of specific violations and determine how a violated system state can be turned back to a 'normal' state by means of a system update. In contrast to commitments, sanctions are not generic and depend on application in hand. For example, in our marketplace organisation, a timed-out commitment caused by agent i who has failed to make a payment will be sanctioned by adding the agent to a blacklist. This sanction can be represented as:
Another possible sanction can be designed to cope with a detached commitment that is cancelled by its debtor. For example, suppose agent j sends the book before deadline t 2 after which agent i cancels the commitment. The cancel action by i violates the detached commitment
One may want to sanction such a violation by charging i the shipping cost paid by j (and possibly some additional administration costs). Such a sanction can be represented by the following rule, which indicates that agent i should pay the shipping cost (subtract (i,5) ):
Operational Semantics
The specification of an organisation determines the its initial state. The execution of an organisation is determined by a set of transition rules that specify possible transition steps. In the following, we first define the (initial) states of an organisation, followed by the set of four transition rules.
Definition 2. The state of an organisation is specified as σ b , σ i , cr, sr , where
cr is the set of counts-as rules, and sr is the set of sanction rules. Since the counts-as and sanction rules do not change during the execution of organisations, we omit cr and sr from the organisation states and represent an organisation state as σ b , σ i . Let (F, cr, sr) be the initial specification of an organisation. The initial state of the organisation is F, ∅ , i.e., the initial set of institutional facts is the empty set.
In order to compute the set of commitments (and sanctions) that should be generated or modified by the counts-as rules cr (and the sanction rules sr) in a given state of an organisation, we follow [5] and define the closure of a set of propositions under a set of rules. Let cond(()r) and cons(()r) denote the condition and consequent of rule r, respectively. First, we determine the rules R that are applicable to a set of propositions X as:
, which exists due to Knaster/Tarski's fixed point theorem [5] . This fixed point provides the set of heads of all applicable rules.
Let cr be the set of counts-as rules presented in Fig. 2 and cl cr X ↑ ω be the closure of set X under cr. The following transition rule specifies the interaction between two agents through communication action α. Note that the organisation updates the institutional facts (e.g., commitments) based on the performed communication action and by applying the above counts-as rules.
1. com(α) indicates that α is the communicated message, 2.
According to this transition rule, the state of a multi-agent organisation can make a transition when message α is communicated. In this transition the institutional state σ i of the organisation is updated by applying the counts-as rules to determine new institutional facts. The new institutional facts are computed by taking the closure of institutional facts, brute facts, and the performed action under the counts-as rules, i.e., cl cr X ↑ ω \X. Note that the original set of institutional facts, brute facts, and the performed action denoted by X are removed from the closure to obtain the new institutional facts. The second item in the rule specifies the update of the institutional facts by adding new institutional facts to σ i while removing the corresponding institutional facts from σ i . This operation guarantees that the state of commitments (x, y ∈ {c, d, s, vc, vt, e, t})
, changes according to the transitions in the commitment lifecycle depicted in Fig. 1 . Lastly, note that cl cr X ↑ ω \X = ∅ if none of the counts-as rules are applicable. In our running example, the performance of action offer(i, b,20) , t 2 , t 5 )} where a commitment is created. This is accomplished by the application of rule 1.
The next transition rule specifies the performance of non-communicative actions, such as an agent sending a book. Note that counts-as rules 3 and 5 cover the cases where performing a non-communicative action by some agent counts as changing the state of a commitment.
1. act(α) indicates that α is the action, 2. ⊗ is an update operation that changes the state of environment σ b after performing α. We assume the existence of such an update operator. 3. ⊕ is the operator for updating institutional facts as defined above.
The new institutional facts σ i are determined based on σ b , the result of realizing the effect of α on σ b . In our running example, sending the book b by agent j (i.e., α = s (b,i) ) causes a transition of the organisation state from σ b , σ i where
Of course, we assume this is only possible if σ b |= s (b,i) ∧ ¬t 2 indicating that the sending action is indeed performed within the corresponding deadline t 2 . This is accomplished by the application of counts-as rule 3.
Finally, we allow the environment state to change by the internal mechanism of the environment, e.g., the state of a clock changes automatically. This is essential for the application of counts-as rules 7 and 9, which are applicable when the deadline elapses.
This transition rule ensures that elapse of the deadlines are possible and changes the state of the institutional facts accordingly. Let the organisation of our running example be in state σ b , σ i where 20) , and the environment makes a transition such that σ b |= d 5 . In this case, we have
. This is accomplished by the application of the counts-as rule 7.
Sanctions A common scenario is that the organisation imposes sanctions when commitments are violated. For example, a non-paying agent is added to a blacklist. We represent the sanctions by rules connecting commitment violations to a specific update of the organisation state. In order to allow context-dependent sanctions, the antecedent of rules can be composed of both brute and institutional facts. Given a set of sanction rules sr and the state of an organisation σ b , σ i , we define the enforcement of sanctions as the closure of state under the sanction rules, denoted by cl sr (σ b ∪σi) ↑ ω \σ i . The following transition rule ensures that the organisation imposes sanctions when commitments are violated.
The function sanctioned(σ i , σ b , sr) removes all violated commitments from σ i for which sanctions are imposed. Consider again the sanction for the payment violation in our running example, which is represented by the rule
and let the organisation be in the state σ b , σ i where
. The application of this transition rule causes a transition to the state σ b , σ i where σ b |= BL i (i.e., i is blacklisted) and
Multi-Agent System Execution Recall that an organisation has two main processes to perform: (1) monitoring the interaction between agents, and between agents and the environment, to detect norm violations; and (2) enforcing norms by means of sanctions when violations are detected. In our framework, transitions 1-3 are responsible for the monitoring task while transition 4 is responsible for imposing sanctions. The executions of a multi-agent organisation are determined by the transition system which is specified by the transition rules 1-4; the system consists of all possible computational runs. Possible computational runs of an execution are due to different orders of the applications of transition rules 1-4. One may constrain the set of possible computational runs by specifying one specific order for applying transition rules. For example, one order may apply transition rules 1-4 consecutively while a second order applies transition rules 1-3 interspersed by the application of transition rule 4. According to the first order, the organisation allows (1) agents to communicate, (2) agents to interact with the environment, (3) the environment to make a transition, and (4) the organisation to impose sanctions. By contrast, the second order imposes sanctions immediately after each of the three activities. Note that the first order allows different violations to occur before sanctions are imposed while the second order applies the sanctions immediately. The consequences of these different orders will be studied in the next section.
Example
Chopra et al. [7] describe an insurance claim process involving a vehicle repair, with the actors being the driver claimant (assumed to be not at fault, and whose policy has no deductible), the driver's insurance company, a car repair garage, and a damage assessor.
,
In our example scenario, the agents are a Customer (who owns the car), an Insurer (who pays for repairs), a Repairer (who conducts the repair), and an Assessor (who decides how much the repair should cost). Commitments between agents model the business protocols of the process: 7 -C 1 : insurer to repairer: if insurance has been validated and the repair has been reported, then the insurer will have paid and approved the assessment within 7 days -C 2 : insurer to assessor: if the assessment has been done, the assessment will have been paid within 5 days -C 3 : assessor to repairer: if damages have been reported and the insurance has been validated, a damage assessment will have been performed within 2 days -C 4 : repairer to customer: if the insurance has been validated and the car was damaged, then the car will have been repaired within 8 days -C 5 : insurer to customer: if the premium has been paid, then the insurance will have been validated within 8 days
Hence, formally, we have a set of social commitments as follows. Note that we specify relative deadlines for the consequent of commitments using the notation +x to indicate x days after the antecedent becomes true. ∅ indicates an absence of a deadline.
In the scenario, the car owner reports an accident to her insurance company, and takes the car to a garage. On certification that the insurance is valid (because the customer has paid the insurance premium), the repair garage accepts the damaged car and contacts the assessor. Since the insurance is valid, the repair garage commences the repair. The assessor reports to the insurance company, which approves the assessment of damage and pays the assessor for its work. The repair garage reports to the insurance company when it has completed the repair, and with the approval of the insurer, the garage then tells the customer that the car is ready. The insurer pays the repair garage.
Consider now a set of agent actions corresponding to this scenario. These actions are manifest in communication actions, and the impact of the actions upon the commitment store. The trace in Table 1 begins with the offers that create the five commitments. Column Rule gives the Counts-as Rule. We abbreviate the logical propisitions by their initials, e.g., pp for premium-paid. In line 6, the customer proves payment of the insurance. In line 9, she reports car damage. In line 14, the garage has completed the repair. In line 17, the garage tells the customer the car is ready.
} {aa, ad, ap, cd, dr, iv, pd, pp, rr} Table 1 . Execution trace in car insurance scenario.
Properties
The propositions in this section show various kind of properties following from our approach and operational semantics; due to space limitations, we leave the proofs for the full version of this paper.
Temporal properties
We study first temporal properties, i.e., the dynamics of the commitment states. These properties illustrate that the commitment states follow the commitment lifecycle in Fig. 1 . In this subsection, we assume that each offer(x, y, p, q, d 1 , d 2 ) is done with unique p and q, such that there is no interference. We discuss the lifting of this assumption in the following subsection.
We begin by stating continuity properties about conditional and detached commitments: they hold until they are fulfilled or the deadline is reached. We use Linear Time Logic LTL with the release operator, not to be confused with the release communication action of Sect. 2.1: φ releases ψ if ψ is true until the first position in which φ is true (or forever if such a position does not exist). We assume execution traces to be fair. 
Second, we can state continuity properties about reaching termination states: each conditional and detached commitment state will lead to precisely one termination state. , Proposition 2. For any commitment, we have at most one of
, and C t (x, y, p, q, d 1 , d 2 ) true at any time.
Third, we can state continuity properties about some of the termination states: once they are true, they will stay true. This does not hold for the violation states, as the violation will be removed once the sanction is applied.
hold, then they will hold forever.
Further temporal properties can be defined to illustrate that the operational semantics behaves according to the commitment lifecycle in Fig. 1 . Since the characterization of these properties is relatively straightforward, we turn here to two other classes of properties which can be defined for our operational semantics. Figure 1 is a bit misleading in the sense that in practice there is not a single commitment cycle at the same time, but many of them operate in parallel. In this section we consider whether one commitment cycle can affect another one; we call this interference. We now consider the lifting of the assumption that each offer(x, y, p, q, t (b,i) ). This leads to two detached commitments, namely 20) ) by agent i will now move both detached commitments to satisfied commitments, i.e., agent i de-commits itself by paying 20 euro instead of 40 euro. 8 This example illustrates that the agents must be careful to distinguish propositions. In this case, the agents should syntactically distinguish the two propositions referring to pay 20 euro, and it is left to the agent to prevent this undesired interference.
Interference
C d (i, j, s (b,i) , p (b,20) , t 2 , t 5 ) and C d (i, j, t (b,i) , p (b,20) , t 2 , t 5 ). Performing action do(i, p (b,
Redundancy
Redundancy properties concern communication actions that, if omitted as part of a sequence of communication actions, do not change the final set of institutional facts [3] . We confine ourselves to an example of a redundancy property, as follows.
Consider a sanction system where agents are blacklisted regardless of the commitment they violated, i.e., containing the following two rules:
In the context of our running example, we say that an offer is blacklist redundant if it does not change the situations in which an agent will be blacklisted. Given a sequence of offers, which offers can be made in addition which are in this sense blacklist redundant?
is blacklist redundant. If I have offered you that if you do p I will do q, then it is redundant to offer you that if you do p ∧ r then I will do q, under the same conditions.
is blacklist redundant. If I have offered you that if you do p I will do q ∧ r, then it is redundant to offer you that I will do q, under the same conditions.
is blacklist redundant. If I have offered you that if you do p I will do q, and if you do r I will do q, then it is redundant to offer you that if you do p ∨ r then I will do q, under the same conditions.
is blacklist redundant. If I have offered you that if you do p I will do q, and if you do p I will do r, then it is redundant to offer you that I will do q ∧ r, under the same conditions.
The redundancy properties give some deeper insight in the system, but they depend on the sanctioning system adopted by the organisation. The above properties still hold when the sanction system does not depend on the actual commitment that is violated, but only that some commitment has been violated. Another way of reasoning says that the sanction depends only on q-not on p, the agents x and y, or the deadlines. This yields a subset of the above properties. A further refinement is to assume relations among sanctions. For example, a sanction for violating the offer to do p should not be more than that for violating the offer to do p ∧ q. We leave this matter for future work.
Discussion
The idea of non-communicative actions and the enforcement of sanctions by monitoring the state of commitments is something common in the agent literature. The schema of our model is standard when dealing with commitments in agents organizations: organizations consist of facts, norms, commitments and sanction, the agents can perform a set of actions which lead to the creation of commitments, and these commitments have rules in form of count-as rules and when the commitments are violated, sanctions apply [17, 9, 14, 11, 12, 16, 6, 13, 4, 1, 7, 15, 8] . Moreover, formalizations are often based on a life-cycle for commitments using an operational semantics. However, the aim is typically to give a semantics for a large variety of speech acts, for example for propose or request, and they therefore have to define their semantics in considerable detail. Moreover, the trend is to make the languages ever more complex, for example by introducing higher order commitments, meta-commitments [19] , embedded temporal regulations [1] , goal of organizations, other norms than commitment-based ones, and so on. Chopra , and Singh [8] are interested in simplifying the specification of commitment-based protocols or requirements. Our aim is in line with the latter paper. We start from the life cycle of commitments and define a minimal language to make all possible changes to the commitment base. Moreover, due to this minimal approach, our approach is more generic. We can define a range of operational semantics by changing the constitutive norms. Our purpose is not to define an ACL but to establish how norms are be operationalized in an organisation setting. Compared to this earlier work, our approach differs in that: (1) We use counts-as rules explicitly as technical constructs while Fornara et al. [11] , for instance, treat counts-as relation primarily as linguistic conventions. Note that counts-as rules in our work can be seen as defeasible rules. We adopt a contemporary life cycle of commitments, following [8] and precedents.
Conclusion and Future Work
Our approach presents a generic methodology that can be applied to different sets of counts-as rules: for instance, variants of Fig. 2 that reflect variants of the commitment life cycle, e.g., if conditional commitments are created only after explicit acceptance by the creditor. It further can permit constitutive norms that change dynamically. We discuss temporal properties, interference, and redundancy. First, the temporal properties are the usual specification and verification properties defined for operational semantics. Second, the interference properties refer to the possible interaction between offers. For example, can a single communication act detach multiple commitments? Third, the redundancy properties, which are more involved than temporal and interference properties, give a form of implicit logical relations between the communication actions.
Our on-going work is to characterize the properties of the operational semantics and to prove them. In this paper, we considered two principal communication actions: offer and tell. Extending the set of communication actions should be done carefully since commitments may create unwanted interferences. Second, we considered here generic counts-as rules that were designed based on the semantics of specific communication actions (i.e., offer and tell). A possible extension would be to investigate the interaction between such generic counts-as rules and domain-specific counts-as rules representing domain-specific norms. For example, we can consider norms such as "buying a book while having no money on a credit card counts-as a violation". Third, a further issue not considered in this paper is the role of interaction protocols in agents' interactions. We would like to enrich the representation of an organisation with-in addition to countsas and sanction rules-interaction protocols that constrain the order of communication actions. Finally, the dynamics of organisations is an important topic which we have not treated here. We think there is potential in exploring a mechanism to dynamically change the rules of the constitutive norms and sanctions.
